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Evolution of Economy in Spain
Spain is one the most important countries of the EU. At the time
this paper was written, Spain was the fifth EU country in terms
of both GDP and population after Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, and Italy. Spain joined the European Union in 1986,
9 years after the arrival of its democracy.
Consequences of Joining the European Union
When Spain joined the European Union, it lagged far behind the
average of the European countries in terms of the most relevant
macroeconomic indicators: income per capita, public capital
stock, inflation, interest rates, and unemployment rates (European
Monetary Institute 1996). However, the adherence of Spain to the
European Union substantially contributed to the improvement of
Spain’s economy. This effect was particularly outstanding after
Spain began using the single currency in 1999.
Fig. 1 shows the evolution over time of some key macroeco-
nomic indicators comparing Spain with the EU-15. The EU-15 in-
cludes the first 15 countries to join the European Union
and includes all those that are the most economically developed:
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy,
United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Spain for many years experienced
a sustained GDP growth above the average of the EU-15. The em-
ployment rate defined as the ratio of the working population to the
number of people aged between 16 and 65 years old grew at a much
faster pace in Spain than in the EU-15. The inflation rate, however,
was higher in Spain than in the EU-15, which was likely caused by
the increase in economic activity. Finally, the public investment to
GDP ratio was much greater in Spain than in the EU-15 because of
the effort made by Spain to expand its public infrastructure net-
works. Despite the good performance of Spain until 2007, things
became much worse after 2008. Fig. 1 shows how the recession
struck Spain much more sharply than the EU-15 in terms of reduc-
tion of GDP growth and the decrease in the employment rate.
Infrastructure Investment
Several reasons explain why Spain made such a great effort in in-
creasing its public infrastructure from 2000 to 2008. First, Spain’s
economy boomed during this period so budgetary resources
available for infrastructure became more abundant. Second, the
European Union provided a lot of funding to Spain to be invested
in infrastructure. Third, Spain made good use of different types of
PPP approaches in order to raise funds from the private sector to
fund infrastructure.
One of the policy goals of the European Union is to promote
economic convergence among the European regions. To that
end, the EU has put into effect several means of channeling resour-
ces so as to cofund infrastructure in the poorest regions of Europe in
order to help those regions rise economically so as to approach the
average of the European Union (Vassallo 2011). The two most im-
portant instruments implemented by the EU for this purpose were
the European regional development fund (ERDF) and the cohesion
fund (CF). The ERDF provides funding in order to foster produc-
tivity in the regions of the European Union with structural prob-
lems, especially those whose income per capita is below 75% of
the average of the EU. While the ERDF has been used to fund
a variety of initiatives, such as schools, hospitals, programs for rural
development, and similar measures, it has also been intensively
used for funding infrastructure in the poorest regions.
The CF was created by the European Union in 1994. The role of
this fund is to help the poorest EU countries to improve their
macroeconomic indicators. The CF was mostly designed to help
the poorest countries of the EU to keep on building infrastructure
even as they were making efforts to reduce their public deficit.
Fig. 1. Evolution of the macroeconomic indicators in Spain and the EU-15 before and after the economic recession
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT IN ENGINEERING © ASCE / OCTOBER 2012 / 399
The CF is allowed to fund transportation and environmental infra-
structure only. The EU allows the CF to cofund up to 85% of the
whole capital cost of eligible infrastructure projects. Up to 2006,
the only countries eligible to receive cohesion funds in Europe were
Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland. Because of its size, Spain
received the lion’s share of the CF until 2006. Most of the CF
received by Spain was devoted to the construction of some of the
high-speed rail lines.
Spain took full advantage of the funds provided by the EU.
From 2000 to 2006, Spain received 16,375 million Euro from
the EU for transport infrastructure investment (2,340 million Euro
a year on average). However, since 2006, the European funds re-
ceived by Spain have been steadily dwindling. Two reasons explain
this trend: first, Spain has experienced a greater growth than the
average of the European Union so it has improved its economic
position compared to other countries; second, the countries of
Eastern Europe that have recently joined the EU have contributed
to reducing the average GDP of the European Union so Spain be-
came relatively less poor after the incorporation of so many new
member states with much lower levels of economic development.
Consequently, the amount allocated to Spain for transport infra-
structure in the period 2007–2013 was reduced to 4,901 million
Euro (700 million Euro a year on average). In addition to the
European funding, one of the main explanations for the high rate
of public investment in Spain was the deliberate promotion of
different types of PPPs for the building of infrastructure. From
2003 to 2010, both the central and the regional governments pro-
cured infrastructure PPP contracts totaling on average 6,280 million
Euro a year, which is approximately 20% of the public infrastruc-
ture investment in Spain.
Economic Recession and Its Causes
The economic recession in Spain has been caused by both exog-
enous and endogenous factors. The most important exogenous
causes are two: the price rise of raw materials, such as copper
and oil, and the influence of the global financial crisis. The endog-
enous causes are also two: first, the real estate bubble that damaged
the financial system due to the great exposure of the Spanish banks
to mortgages; second, the limited capacity of Spain to respond to
the crisis because of the low productivity of the Spanish workforce,
the lack of flexibility in the labor market, and a high indebtedness in
both the public and the private sector.
The impact of the economic crisis in Spain has been one of the
greatest among the European countries. The country was in reces-
sion for seven quarters, which was reflected in negative GDP
growths in both 2009 and 2010. This provoked an accelerated in-
crease of the unemployment rate that in 2010 surpassed 20% of the
working population, the highest among the EU-15 countries. In this
same year Germany and France, by contrast, had unemployment
rates of 7 and 9.7% respectively.
A report prepared by the Banco de España (2011) claimed that
the recovery of Spain will be slow and strongly dependant on the
evolution of the European economy. Estimates for 2011 forecast a
GDP growth of around 1% accompanied by an inflation rate of over
2.5%. These forecasts seem to indicate that the crisis will take much
longer to be concluded than expected.
The poor economic situation of Spain at that time was also
threatened by the likely rise of oil prices caused by the turmoil that
in 2011 was taking place in North Africa. This situation can end up
having a great impact on Spain’s economy because of its high en-
ergy dependence on sources abroad. Moreover, in March 2011, the
EU announced a rise in the interest rates of the euro to mitigate the
inflationary effect that might come from the increase in oil prices,
which can end up harming the Spanish economy even more.
Toll Highway Concessions in Spain
Spain has extensive experience in managing and financing high-
ways through PPPs. Most of the PPPs have been put into effect
through concession contracts that have a long tradition in Spanish
law. From the beginning, highway concessions in Spain were com-
petitively awarded to private consortia through competitive tenders.
This is substantially different from the situation in such other
European countries as France and Italy, which directly entrusted
toll highways to public-private companies that were mostly con-
trolled by the government. Most of the highway concessions
awarded in Spain have been toll highways. In the last few years,
however, there has been a great increase in the number of other PPP
approaches, such as shadow-toll or performance-based contracts.
History
Three different periods regarding the implementation of highway
concessions in Spain can be identified: from 1967 to 1975, from
1976 to 1995, and from 1996 to the present. Between 1967 and
1975, 2,042 km of toll highways were granted by the central
government of Spain. There are two reasons for the Spanish gov-
ernment’s decision to start a toll highway program as a means of
expanding and improving the Spanish highway network. First, the
economic growth that Spain experienced during those years
prompted a great rise in traffic, which suddenly made better high-
ways come to be regarded as a necessity. Second, the state budget in
Spain was not able to afford such a huge investment, so private
funding was the only means available to reach that goal.
The government decided to add certain fiscal advantages and
financial guarantees to the highway concession contracts in order
to attract funding for such projects from financial institutions and
other investors. The main ones were tax breaks, loan guarantees,
and exchange insurance provided by the State for those loans de-
nominated in foreign currency. The two petroleum crises that the
industrialized countries experienced in the 1970s had a huge impact
on the guarantees provided by the Spanish government to highway
concessionaires. On the one hand, the rise in gas prices caused traf-
fic growth to be lower than expected. On the other hand, exchange
rates became substantially unstable. These factors triggered the
guarantees that had been incorporated in the already-existing con-
tracts, which ultimately became very expensive for the government.
In fact, the Spanish government continues until today to meet
certain financial commitments made to those holding highway
concession contracts dating back to the early 1970s.
The results of the implementation of concession contracts in
Spain during this period were controversial. On the one hand, high-
way concessions achieved the goal of providing the country with a
modern highway network at a time when the public budget of Spain
was not sufficient to afford such a huge cost. On the other hand, the
guarantees made by the government to facilitate the funding
of those concessions over time became very costly for the country
(Izquierdo and Vassallo 2004).
The second stage dates from 1975 to 1995. In this period, no
highway concession was awarded. There were several reasons
for this. First, the two petroleum crises in the 1970s destabilized
the Spanish economy. Second, after the dictatorship ended, the
political atmosphere in Spain was uncertain. Third, and most im-
portant, the socialist government, which took office in 1982 and
remained in power until 1996, was politically opposed to promot-
ing private concessions as a means to finance highways. Instead,
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the socialist government opted for modernizing the Spanish road
network by widening and upgrading the most important roads,
turning them into dual-roadway fast lanes with quality standards
set well below those for toll highways. This new program was com-
pletely funded by the public sector, which funding constituted a
significant burden for the Spanish government.
The third stage began in 1996 and continues to the present. In
1996, the conservative People’s Party took office in Spain. The
need to contain Spain’s public deficit was the most difficult chal-
lenge facing the new government. This was the main reason why
the new government decided to implement once again the policy of
offering concessions so as to encourage the participation of the pri-
vate sector in the financing of new transportation infrastructure.
The socialist government, which took office in 2004, retained its
faith in the concession system though it promoted fewer toll high-
ways than the People’s Party. From 1996 to now, 835 km of new
toll highways concessions have been awarded by the central
government of Spain through this approach. Table 1 displays a
summary of the toll highway concessions awarded by the central
government of Spain from 1996 up to now that were in operation at
the time this paper was written. The Málaga–Alto de la Pedrizas
highway, which at the time of this writing was still under construc-
tion, is not included in Table 1.
In order to facilitate the analysis, the toll highway concessions
awarded from 1995 on are classified into three different groups.
Group 1 is made up of toll concessions competing with conven-
tional single roads in interurban corridors with a low density of
population. These are basically toll highways linking an origin with
a destination but with low levels of short-distance traffic. The
second group is made up of toll motorways that directly compete
with free highways experiencing peak-hour or seasonal congestion.
They are located around urban areas and are subject to highly
changeable urban and transport supply environments. The third
group is made up of toll highway concessions in corridors with
a high population density; most of them are in tourist destinations
along the coast. The toll highways within Group 3 compete not
only with single roads but also with free highways in different cor-
ridors that may be an alternative for certain origin-destination pairs.
Unlike Group 1, toll highways in Group 3 channel traffic to and
from a variety of origins and destinations.
Legal Framework
The legal framework on PPPs in Spain has changed significantly
through the years. The first highway concessions were awarded on
the basis of specific decrees passed by the government. In 1972 a
new law, called the Toll Highway Law, was passed. Its purpose was
the regulation of toll highway concession contracts and the public
guarantees applicable to them.
However, the most important development regarding legislation
about concession contracts in Spain occurred with the approval of
the public works concession law in 2003. This law was promptly
incorporated as part of the framework of the public contracts law.
The objectives of this law were, among others, to update the old
highway concession model and to extend it to every type of public
works, to reinforce the contribution of private financing for the con-
struction and maintenance of public facilities, and to define a new
risk-sharing approach. This law considerably restricted public guar-
antees, even though it incorporated several mechanisms whereby
the public sector could eventually contribute to the financial fea-
sibility of concession contracts.
In 2007, a new public contracts law was passed in Spain in order
to transpose new EU legislation about public contracts to the
Spanish legal framework. This new law basically maintained the
legal framework set up in 2003 regarding concession contracts
though some slight modifications were incorporated. Moreover,
the new public contracts law made necessary, in its final version,
the passage of a new law for the regulation of funding sources for
concessions and PPPs in Spain. In 2010, the government circulated
a first draft of this law.
One of the most controversial clauses of the Spanish concession
law is the one that sets up the compensation to the concessionaire in
case of early termination of the contract. This clause establishes
that if the contract terminates earlier, and bankruptcy is one of
the causes of termination of the contract, the government will have
to pay a compensation to the concessionaire for the works that have
been built and have not yet depreciated. This compensation will be
equal to the capital cost declared by the concessionaire in its finan-
cial plan minus the depreciation of the assets calculated according
to the accounting norms of Spain. Regardless of the principle under
which this guarantee is based, the fact is that this guarantee may
have serious negative consequences for the government since the
committed payments will immediately increase the size of the












Tolls for cars Euros/
vehicles × km 2009
Minimum Maximum
Group 1 Ávila-Villacastín 1999 23.1 Interurban Single road 0.0281 0.0763
Santiago-Alto de Santo
Domingo
1999 56.5 Interurban Single road 0.0780 0.0780
Segovia-El Espinar 1999 27.7 Interurban Single road 0.0426 0.1059
León-Astorga 2000 37.7 Interurban Single road 0.0403 0.0884
Ocaña-La Roda 2004 127.5 Interurban Single road Free highway 0.0797 0.0925
Group 2 R-2 Madrid-Guadalajara 2000 62.3 Suburban access to Madrid Free highway Public transport 0.0800 0.1900
R-3 Madrid-Arganda 1999 31.8 Suburban access to Madrid Free highway Public transport 0.0761 0.1002
R-5 Madrid-Navalcarnero 1999 28.9 Suburban access to Madrid Free highway Public transport 0.0602 0.1202
R-4 Madrid-Ocaña 2000 52.5 Suburban access to Madrid Free highway Public transport 0.0761 0.1002
Eje aeropuerto 2002 9.4 Urban access to the airport Free highway Public transport 1.5100 1.5100
Madrid-Toledo 2004 60.0 Suburban access to Madrid Free highway Public transport 0.0773 0.0926





75.7 Interurban Single road 0.1991 0.3249
Alicante-Cartagena 1998 76.6 Interurban Single road Free highway 0.0575 0.1021
Cartagena-Vera 2004 112.6 Interurban Single road Free highway 0.0315 0.0926
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public deficit of Spain just when, because of the economic crisis,
the country is being required to cut its deficit.
Main Features of Concession Contracts in Spain
Toll highway concessions in Spain have retained most of their dis-
tinctive features throughout the years, even though there are some
differences between the concessions awarded in the first period
(1967–1975) and the concessions awarded in the third period
(from 1996 to the present). Procurement of highway concessions
in Spain has been done largely on the basis of an “open procedure.”
This procedure means that any company that fulfills the minimum
requirements, as set out by the government in the contract’s pro-
visions, in the main having to do with that company’s previous ex-
perience in operating highways and evidence of sufficient financial
strength, is allowed to participate in the tendering process.
Unlike other long-term infrastructure contracts in the world,
e.g., design build finance operate contracts in the United Kingdom
and most of the PPP contracts in Germany, concession contracts
in Spain were not agreed upon in negotiations between the
government and the bidders. Rather, the government submits
standard contracts to the bidders through the bidding terms that
eventually will have to be accepted by all the concessionaires.
The concession contracts in Spain are consequently rather in-
complete since they are not negotiated for each project. However,
transaction costs for both bidders and the government are very low
in Spain as compared to other countries. This enables many com-
panies to take part in the tender, which enhances competition and
efficiency (Sánchez-Soliño and Gago 2010). This is probably the
most important reason why the number of bidders participating in
the tendering processes for highway concessions in Spain is often
quite large (Vassallo and Sánchez-Soliño 2007).
Another feature of concession tenders in Spain is that, although
the government requires the bidders to submit a business plan in
their offers, the government does not require that they have to reach
a financial close before the contract is awarded. In spite of that,
once the contract is awarded, the bidding terms usually establish
a deadline for the concessionaire to reach the financial close.
For toll highways, maximum toll levels are set up in the contract
for each one of the preestablished vehicle categories. According to
the contract, the tolls are updated every year to bring them into line
with inflation. The contracts permit the concessionaires a certain
flexibility in reducing the tolls outside of the peak hours. In Table 1,
the toll rates of the concessions analyzed in this paper are included.
Another innovation recently introduced in Spain is the so-called
“progress clause.” This clause consists of requiring the concession-
aire to maintain and operate the public works according to the tech-
nical, environmental, and safety regulations that are currently in
force and applicable. The aim of this clause is to guarantee that
the concessionaire is going to adequately maintain and operate
the highway throughout the years. Since the implementation of this
clause in 2003, the technological risk has been transferred to the
private sector.
The risk allocation principles followed by concession contracts
in Spain establish that the private sector should be allocated most of
the market risks. In spite of that, the legislation still permits allo-
cation to the government of the risks that are either manageable by
the government or cannot be sensibly managed by any other stake-
holders (Vassallo and Gallego 2005). According to Spanish law, the
government has the right to change the terms of the contract to
bring it more closely into line with the public interest. If this change
affects the economic balance of the concession, the initial condi-
tions can be modified in favor of either the concessionaire or the
government in order to compensate for this change. Similarly, if the
government takes an action not foreseen when the contract was
signed and this action substantially affects the economics of the
contract, the economic balance should also be reestablished. More-
over, the Spanish legislation requires that the government must
reestablish the economic balance of the contract to the benefit
of the relevant party when circumstances of force majeure, under-
stood by the Spanish legislation as fire caused by atmospheric elec-
tricity, natural phenomena with catastrophic implications, and
damages caused by war and serious alterations of the public order,
lead directly to substantial disruption of the financial terms of the
concession. In addition to that, Spanish law enables but does not
oblige the contracting parties to set up a procedure to mitigate traf-
fic risk by setting up a minimum and maximum threshold in the
terms for any variable related to the financial result, e.g., traffic
and revenues, of the concession as defined in the bidding terms.
Unfortunately, this measure has not been adopted yet in any of
the toll concession highways in Spain.
Effects of Recession in Toll Highway Concessions
in Spain
This paper focuses on the analysis of the toll highway concessions
awarded in the third stage mentioned previously, from 1996 up to
now. Therefore, the paper concentrates just on the short-term dis-
location caused by the recession. The old concessions, i.e., those
awarded in the early 1970s, are set aside for several reasons. First,
most of the concessions awarded during that first stage are about to
reach their end so the impact of the crisis is not so significant for the
viability of the business. Second, there is little information about
the offers that the bidders made when those concessions were
granted so long ago, making it difficult to compare their estimates
with the real outcomes.
Traffic Share in Corridors
Toll highways in Spain have always a rival route, the free alterna-
tive serving the same corridor, in such a way that the users of high-
ways have the option to choose between the toll highway that offers
them better quality and shorter travel time and that free alternative,
often a conventional single road and in some cases a free highway,
which offers them lower quality and longer travel times. Table 1
describes the characteristics of the competition in the main corridor
and other alternative competition, such as public transportation
around the urban areas or free highways which, not being located
in the same corridor, may become attractive alternatives for some
origin-destination pairs.
Table 2 shows the traffic share of the toll highways in their main
corridors up to 2009 (data for 2010 were not available in early
2011). Toll highways competing with single roads have a much
greater share than toll highways competing with free highways.
The share of the urban concessions included in Group 2 diminished
from 2008 to 2009 at a sharper pace than did the share of those
concessions included in Groups 1 and 3, which mostly compete
with single roads.
Table 2 compares the traffic growth in the toll highways with
traffic growth in their corridors in three different periods: from
the beginning of their operation to 2007; from 2007 to 2008 when
the recession was beginning; and from 2008 to 2009 when the re-
cession was at its peak. Several results emerge from this analysis.
The first is that before the recession, from the beginning of the con-
cession’s operation up to 2007, most of the toll highway conces-
sions experienced traffic growths higher than the average GDP
growth in Spain and higher in general than the traffic growth in
their respective corridors. This means that while the economy
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was doing well, the users tend to be more prone to use the toll high-
ways than their free alternatives. There are two reasons that might
explain that. The first one is that the greater the income of families
and firms, the higher will be their willingness to pay. The second
reason is that the greater the total traffic in the corridor, i.e., traffic
that increases when the economy does well, the worse will be the
congestion problems in the free alternative.
The second result is that the effect of the crisis, which started in
2008 and reached its peak in 2009, had a great impact on the traffic
volumes in almost all the corridors. The effect of the crisis was even
more notable in the toll highways, particularly at the peak of the
economic recession. This fact demonstrates that toll highway con-
cessions reflect and amplify the state of the economy. If the
economy does well, traffic in toll concessions will do even better;
if the economy performs poorly, traffic in toll concessions will per-
form even more poorly. A consequence of this analysis is that toll
concessions competing with direct alternatives are actually more
risky than the average risk for the economy.
The third result shows that the impact of the crisis is, overall,
greater in toll highways included in Groups 2 and 3 than it is in toll
highways located in Group 1. For the case of Group 2, urban toll
highways, the explanation might be that these concessions have
greater competition than the ones in other groups. For the case
of Group 3, seasonal toll highways, the reason might be that sea-
sonal traffic is expected to be more affected by the recession.
Business Performance of Toll Highway Concessions
This section describes the risks that have been affected the most by
the economic recession: traffic demand and cost overruns in the
acquisition of the right of way. The crisis had a great impact on
the performance of the concession contracts, particularly on the
main source of revenues for the concessionaires, which is traffic
demand. The behavior of actual traffic compared to the expected
traffic is a key component of the ultimate profitability of the con-
cessionaire (Baeza 2008). Table 3 summarizes traffic deviations in
the 15 highways analyzed. These deviations measure the difference
between the actual traffic and the estimates originally made and
relied on by the concessionaire in its bid. Negative values of the
deviations show traffic overestimations, whereas positive values
show traffic underestimation.
In Table 3, the following results are obtained. First, traffic levels
were substantially overestimated by all the concessionaires during
the years analyzed. The only exception was the Málaga-Estepona-
Guadiaro highway where traffic predictions underestimated traffic
from year 4 on. However, overestimates of demand do not occur
only in Spain but they are quite usual in transportation infrastruc-
ture facilities, particularly in highway projects (Flyvbjerg 2005;
Flyvbjerg et al. 2005).
Second, on average, the accuracy of the estimates tends to im-
prove over time if the economy grows. This may be caused by what
is called the “ram up” effect (Bain 2009). This effect means that
during the first few years after a new highway is opened, the
new highway has fewer users than it would have had if the users
were used to the existence of the highway. This happens because
the users need a certain lapse of time to familiarize themselves with
the existence of the new infrastructure and its effect within the
transportation network.
However, the trend described previously changed in 2008 be-
cause of the recession. For this year, the traffic estimates turn
out to be less accurate than for the previous year. The only excep-
tions to this rule are the highways that in 2008 were in their first
years of the ramp-up period (Cartagena-Vera and Circunvalación de
Alicante). In 2009, the outcome became even less favorable for the
concessionaires.
Third, the toll motorways that compete directly with a free high-
way, which coincide with the Group 2 highways (the rows printed
in bold and italics in Table 3) show, in general, higher levels of
overestimation than is the case with the toll highways that mainly
compete with single roads. The overall consequence of the traffic
behavior is that greenfield toll concessions tend to improve their
performance over the years if the economy grows positively. How-
ever, most of the toll concessions awarded in Spain from 1996 on
had to tackle the economic recession just at the ramp-up period,
which is the very period when the greatest traffic growths were
expected.







corridor (%) Traffic growth in the toll highways (%) Traffic growth in the corridor (%)
2008 2009
First year of
operation; 2007 2007–2008 2008–2009
First year of
operation; 2007 2007–2008 2008–2009
Average annual growth of the real
GDP in Spain
0.9 −3.7 0.90 −3.70 0.90 −3.70
Group 1 Ávila-Villacastín 2002 67.3 67.8 6.50 −1.00 17.26 −0.65 −5.5 16.21
Santiago-Alto de Santo
Domingo
2003 51.8 51.8 13.50 3.70 3.13 7.40 −2.91 3.18
Segovia-El Espinar 2003 55.6 52.9 5.90 −3.24 5.58 9.70 −23.00 10.97
León-Astorga 2003 33.4 33.0 2.60 4.43 −4.41 1.30 1.44 −3.36
Ocaña-La Roda 2006 50.3 50.4 8.20 2.47 −3.29 −1.80 −5.45 −3.46
Group 2 R-2 Madrid-Guadalajara 2003 11.2 10.3 8.80 −3.66 −11.8 2.90 −3.72 −4.00
R-3 Madrid-Arganda 2004 13.5 12.8 15.00 −4.19 −4.54 4.60 2.38 0.94
R-5 Madrid-Navalcarnero 2004 12.2 11.6 3.70 −4.46 −5.89 6.20 −5.47 −0.76
R-4 Madrid-Ocaña 2004 16.6 14.7 22.00 −8.85 −15.2 7.80 −13.80 −4.78
Eje aeropuerto 2005 53.8 52.3 NA 0.77 −2.59 NA 11.40 0.22
Madrid Toledo 2006 4.1 3.44 −0.10 −13.2 −21.6 6.90 9.19 −5.63
Circunvalación Alicante 2007 10.6 9.1 — 7.16 −21.3 NA −4.35 −8.44
Group 3 Málaga-Estepona-Guadiaro 1999 48.1 46.4 6.40 −5.95 −8.02 1.60 −4.54 −4.55
Alicante-Cartagena 2001 69.1 69.1 9.70 −8.34 −9.33 8.00 −6.73 −9.29
Cartagena-Vera 2007 50.5 NA — 2.88 −13.6 — −1.93 NA
Note: NA = not available.
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The traffic issue was aggravated in some concessions belonging
to Group 2 due to the high cost overruns in the acquisition of the
right of way. In Spain, the expropriation risk has often been trans-
ferred to the private sector. The process works in such a way that
once the government declares that the acquisition of the right of
way is in the “public interest,” the concessionaire will be in charge
of managing the land acquisition process under the government
umbrella. To expropriate land, the concessionaire has to pay the
land’s owner the value originally set by the government. If the land-
owner does not agree with that value, he can appeal to the court of
justice. If the court of justice concludes that the value of the land is
higher than the amount fixed the government, the concessionaire
will have to pay that higher amount to the landowners.
In the case of some of the toll highways giving access to Madrid
City (R-2, R-3, R-4, and R-5), the government thought that the
value of the land necessary to build them was going to be similar
to the cost for rural properties since the land acquired had qualified
as rural land. However, the landowners appealed to the court of
justice and that court eventually resolved matters in favor of the
landowners, concluding that the land acquired was located close
to the city and the construction of a new highway raised the value
of the land nearby to a greater extent than previously assumed. As a
consequence, the court stated that the concessionaire had to pay a
much higher amount to the landowners, approximately 10 times
the original value that had been set by the government (Ortega
et al. 2011).
Measures Adopted to Deal with the Recession
Concession contracts for toll highway concessions in Spain have
fully transferred traffic risk to the concessionaires. As mentioned
above previously, the Spanish legislation enables the government
to change the economic balance of the contract in very few circum-
stances: force majeure, changes in the contract terms imposed by
the government, and circumstances prompted by the government
that may substantially affect the economics of the concession con-
tract. In its latest version, the law also permits the incorporation of
traffic risk mitigation mechanisms in the contracts. The Spanish
government has, however, never used them for toll highway
concessions.
The poor economic performance of some concessions, espe-
cially the suburban toll highway concessions around Madrid,
pushed the government to adopt measures to help the concession-
aires to improve the viability of their businesses. In these conces-
sions, traffic overestimation turned out to be particularly high and
cost overruns caused by higher values for land that had to be ex-
propriated became difficult for the concessionaires to bear. The
government will also be substantially harmed if the concessions
ultimately go bankrupt and the contracts have to be terminated.
As noted previously, if a concession goes bankrupt, according to
the Spanish concession law, the government has to compensate
the concessionaire for those works already built and not yet amor-
tized. This will result in a high cost for the government just when
the economy is not doing so well and the government has scarce
budgetary resources and has submitted to a strict control of its pub-
lic deficit. For all the reasons explained previously, the government
approved a set of measures in order to mitigate the effects of the
recession and the large cost overruns in the acquisition of the right
of way experienced by some concessionaires. The most important
measure adopted by the government was the award of subordinated
public participation loans (SPPLs) to the concessionaires in order
to help them to pay the cost overruns for acquiring the right
of way.
Subordinated public participation loans have the following char-
acteristics (Vassallo and Sánchez-Soliño 2007):
• The SPPLs always have to be subordinated to senior debt. Con-
sequently, participating loan holders, i.e., the government in the
case of SPPLs, will be paid back only after the concessionaire
has met its obligations to the senior lenders. However, the par-
ticipating loan holders will be paid back before the shareholders
receive any dividend.
• The expected rate of return of SPPLs is related to the perfor-
mance of the concession. In other words, the better the outcome
of the concession in terms of traffic, sales, profits, or whatever
other variable had been specified in the contract, the greater the
rate of return of SPPLs. The idea behind this approach is that the
government partially shares the profits and losses of the project
with the concessionaire.
• The expected yield of SPPLs should be market based since
otherwise the government could make use of SPPLs to provide
hidden subsidies.




Traffic deviations [(real traffic–forecasted traffic)/forecasted traffic] (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Average annual growth of the real GDP in Spain 4.7 5 3.6 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 4 3.6 0.9 −3.7
Málaga-Estepona-Guadiaro 1999 −45 −28 −18 4 18 22 25 28 29 1 NA
Alicante-Cartagena 2001 −24 −21 −10 −4 −4 −5 −7 −21 NA
Ávila-Villacastín 2002 −34 −25 −19 −20 −19 −14 −15 NA
Santiago-Alto de Santo Domingo 2003 −43 −33 −34 −32 −26 −26 −26
Segovia-El Espinar 2003 −28 −31 −30 −25 −19 −25 NA
León-Astorga 2003 −28 −44 −46 −45 −37 −37 −41
R-2 Madrid-Guadalajara 2003 −63 −58 −58 −47 −43 −48 −54
R-3 Madrid-Arganda 2004 −57 −47 −41 −44 −51 −59
R-5 Madrid-Navalcarnero 2004 −58 −55 −47 −43 −50 −50
R-4 Madrid-Ocaña 2004 −56 −57 −45 −36 −45 −56
Eje aeropuerto 2005 −79 −65 −61 −65 −71
Ocaña-La Roda 2006 −49 −55 −56 NA
Madrid-Toledo 2006 −82 −74 −83 NA
Cartagena-Vera 2007 −70 −65 NA
Circunvalación de Alicante 2007 −40 −37 −55
Note: NA = not available.
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The SPPLs have a definite effect on the traffic risk-sharing ap-
proach of the concession since the higher the real traffic in relation
to that previously forecasted, the higher will be the interest rate to
be paid by the concessionaire to the government. This way, addi-
tional unpredicted profits will be shared between the concessionaire
and the government. If ultimately the real traffic is much higher
than expected, the government will receive higher interest rates
while the concessionaire will have lower profits. Consequently,
the government’s incentive coincides with the concessionaire’s in-
centive since the better the project performs, the larger the SPPL
interest will be. This is the reason why SPPLs are regarded as
a creative means of promoting PPP projects for highway
concessions.
The SPPLs have important advantages as well in terms of
national accounting. Unlike subsidies, SPPLs are treated for
accounting purposes as a financial investment according to the
European National Accounting Standards defined by EUROSTAT
(2002). As long as those financial investments are made based on
market conditions, SPPLs will have no influence on the national
public deficit. This norm has the problem that, because there is
no competition, it is difficult to know if the loan was provided
on market-based conditions. This means that the government could
misuse this mechanism as an implicit subsidy by providing loans
that the concessionaire in the end will not be able to pay back. The
fact that SPPLs have no influence on the national public deficit is
very important for European countries. The establishment of
a common currency in the European Union forced the member
states aiming at joining the euro zone to fulfill strict macroeco-
nomic criteria to encourage convergence among the EU members.
Among those criteria, the lowering of the public deficit became
both the most important and, at the same time, the most difficult
one to meet.
The SPPLs awarded to the concessionaires set interest rates that
would vary depending on the future level of traffic. Thus, if in the
end the traffic becomes much higher than expected, the concession-
aire will have to pay a larger interest rate to the SPPL holder.
However, if traffic remains much lower than expected, the interest
rate to be paid will be 1.75%, which is almost equal to the current
level of inflation.
However, the economics of the concessions was so poor that the
sole award of SPPLs to the concessionaires was not enough to
make the expected yield of the SPPLs to be market based. In order
to solve this problem, the government changed the contract terms of
four of the concessions. The Radial 2 concession, a suburban toll
highway to alleviate congestion in getting in and out Madrid City,
was extended by 14 years, and the tolls were allowed to be in-
creased above the levels originally established in the contract.
The amount of the toll rise has not yet been made public.
The concession contact including both Radial 3 and Radial 5,
also suburban toll highways in the metropolitan area of Madrid,
was authorized to raise their tolls over the values fixed in the origi-
nal contract terms. The aim of this change in the original contract
terms was to guarantee that the project will be able to pay back the
SPPLs provided by the government. This measure has been imple-
mented also in the Alicante Cartagena concession. The contract
terms of the concession Málaga-Alto de Las Pedrizas, which is still
under construction, has also been changed by the government
through a 17-month extension of the concession duration originally
established in the contract and the rise of the tolls originally set up
in the contracts. The amount of the toll rise has not yet been made
public.
In addition to the measures described previously, in December
2010, the Parliament of Spain had just approved a law to support
the concessionaires who have suffered the traffic shortfalls caused
by the economic recession. To that end, the law enables the
government to guarantee to the concessionaires up to 80% of
the revenues originally forecasted for a period of 3 years (2011,
2012, and 2013). Consequently the government will have to pay
the difference between 80% of the forecasted revenues and the rev-
enues actually collected by each concessionaire. As is shown in
Table 3, the revenues for most of the toll concessions are around
50 and 70% of their estimates. The funds to be provided by the
government will be obtained through SPPLs. Consequently, they
will have to be paid back to the government with an interest rate
structure similar to the one described previously. In 2011, the
government will disburse up to 80.1 million Euro to support the
concessions that are enduring serious traffic problems: Radial 2,
Radial 3 and 5, Radial 4, the new access to Madrid Barajas Airport,
Madrid-Toledo, Cartagena-Vera, Ocaña-La Roda, and Circunvala-
ción de Alicante (Baeza and Vassallo 2011). These are the conces-
sions whose operation started in 2003 and after, and consequently
they have been intensely affected by the economic recession.
Although the law does not mention this explicitly, this measure will
likely imply changes in the original contract terms to facilitate the
payback of the SPPLs.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The preceding analysis shows the large impact that an economic
recession can have on the outcome of concession contracts, particu-
larly if the risks have not been correctly allocated. The conclusions
of this research are the following:
• Traffic demand in toll road highway concessions competing
with free alternatives is extremely sensitive to the economic cy-
cles. This means that when the GDP grows positively, traffic in
toll highway concessions tends to grow even more positively.
This is true when the economy is suffering. When GDP de-
creases, traffic in toll highway concessions tends to decrease
even more sharply than does the GDP.
• The sensitivity referred to previously becomes greater in the
cases of seasonal toll highways and in urban toll highways com-
peting with free congested highways than in toll highways with
more stable traffic demands. These two first conclusions are ea-
sily verifiable in Tables 1 and 2.
• The results from the Spanish case shown in Table 3 suggest that
allocating the bulk of traffic risk to the concessionaire, particu-
larly in those concessions whose traffic demand is specially sen-
sitive to GDP (urban and seasonal concessions), may be too
risky to be successfully managed by the private sector. The im-
plementation of either traffic risk mitigation mechanisms or pay-
ment approaches based on availability may offer a good way to
solve this problem.
• The case of Spain demonstrates that the government often pre-
fers to renegotiate rather than terminate the concession contract
earlier. This happens because the guarantee provided by the
Spanish Law in case of bankruptcy may end up being very
costly for the government.
• The guarantee referred to previously does not make much sense
from the standpoint of incentives to the bidders in the tender. If
the bidders understand that the government does not have any
incentive to allow the concession to go bankrupt, they will more
likely make very aggressive offers to win the contract at all
costs with the expectation of renegotiating in the future.
Consequently, the procurement mechanism itself would be
undermined.
• The case of Spain shows how the renegotiation of concession
contracts may result in negative consequences for the users who,
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in the end, have to pay more through the rise in the toll rate or in
the extension of the concession term. In order to avoid this kind
of renegotiation, the government must devote whatever time is
necessary to arrive at accurate estimates and to draft contracts of
the highest quality that cover all eventualities.
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